Bubble Trouble: Is There an End to Endless Quantitative Easing?
The publication earlier this week of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee minutes of Jan. 29-30 seemed to have a similar effect on equity markets as a call from room service to a Las Vegas hotel suite, informing the partying high rollers that the hotel might be running out of Cristal Champagne. Around the world, stocks sold off, and so did gold.
Here are two sentences that caused such consternation:
However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases [the Fed's open-ended, $85 billion-a-month debt monetization program called 'quantitative easing']. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability.
Guys, let’s face it: All this money printing is not without costs and risks. Three problems present themselves:
1) The bigger our balance sheet gets (currently $3 trillion and counting), the more difficult it will be to ever load off some of these assets in the future. When we start liquidating, markets will panic. We might end up having absolutely no manoeuvring space whatsoever.
2) All this money printing will one day feed into higher headline inflation that no statistical gimmickry will manage to hide. Then some folks may expect us to tighten policy, which we won’t be able to do because of 1.
3) We are persistently manipulating quite a few major asset markets here. Against this backdrop, market participants are not able to price risk properly. We are encouraging financial risk-taking and the type of behaviour that has led to the financial crisis in the first place.
All these points are, of course, valid and excellent reasons for stopping “quantitative easing” right away. You may not be surprised that I would advocate the immediate end to “quantitative easing” and any other central bank measures to artificially “stimulate” the economy.
In fact, the whole idea must appear entirely preposterous to any student of capitalism. First, a bunch of bureaucrats in Washington scan an incredible amount of data, plus some anecdotal “evidence,” every month (with the help of 200 or so economists) and then they “set” interest rates. Next, they astutely manipulate bank refunding rates and cleverly guide various market prices so that the overall economy comes out creating more new jobs. All the while, the officially sanctioned devaluing of money (meaning your dollar is worth less today than it was just a year ago) unfolds at the regularly scheduled “harmless pace” of 2%.
There should be no monetary policy in a free market, just as there should be no policy of setting food prices or wage rates, or of centrally adjusting the number of hours in a day.
But the question here is not what I would like to happen, but what is most likely to happen. There is no doubt that we should see an end to “quantitative easing,” but will we see it anytime soon? Has the Fed finally — after creating $1.9 trillion in new “reserves” since Lehman went bust — seen the light? Did they finally get some sense?
Maybe, but I still doubt it. Of course, we cannot know, but my present guess is that they won’t stop quantitative easing anytime soon; they may pause or slow things down for a while, but a meaningful change in monetary policy looks unlikely to me.
The boxed-in central banker
I think that the financial markets and media overestimate the degrees of freedom that central bank officials enjoy. I consider central bankers to be captives of three overwhelming forces:
1. Their own belief system, which still holds that they are the last line of defense between dark and inexplicable economic forces and the helpless public, and that therefore, whenever the data or the markets go down, it is their duty to ride to the rescue. Thus, when the withdrawal of the Cristal dampens the party mood, the Fed will soon feel obliged, by its own inner logic and without any motivation from outside influences, to open another bottle. Just wait until the present debate about an end to QE leads to weaker markets and until, in the absence of the diversion from rallying equity markets, the almost consistently uninspiring “fundamental data” become the focus of attention again, and we will witness another shift in Fed language, again back to “stimulus.”
We had these little twists and turns a couple of times without any major change in trend. Anybody remember the talk of “exit strategies” in the spring of 2011?
Of course, like most state officials, central bank bureaucrats are largely preoccupied with the problems of their own making. It is precisely the Fed’s frequent rescue operations that have created the excessive leverage that causes instability and repeated crises in the first place. However, there are no signs anywhere that, intellectually, the Fed is willing and able to break out of this policy loop.
2. After years of Greenspan puts, Bernanke bailouts, and zero interest rates, the size of the dislocations may be as large as ever. The Wall Street Journal reported that total borrowing by financial institutions is down by about $3 trillion from its all-time high in 2008. That’s the widely heralded “deleveraging.” But does that mean that the current level of about $13.8 trillion is a new equilibrium? The Fed’s balance sheet expanded by almost $2 trillion over the same period, and super-easy monetary policy has provided a powerful disincentive for banks to shrink meaningfully. What is truly sustainable or not will only be discernible once the Fed stops its manipulations altogether and lets the market price things freely. My guess is that we would still have to go through a period of deleveraging and probably of headline deflation. This would be a necessary correction for a still unbalanced economy addicted to cheap credit, but nobody is willing to take this medicine.
3. Politics. Falling stocks, shrinking 401(k) plans, and shaky banks don’t make for a happy electorate. Additionally, the state is increasingly dependent on low borrowing costs and central bank purchases of its debt. The chances of the U.S. government repairing its own balance sheet are slim to none. So dependence on ultralow funding rates and the Fed as lender of last resort (and every resort) will likely continue.
Look at Japan
When it comes to any of the major trends in global central banking of the past 25 years, Japan has consistently been leading the pack. In the mid-’90s, Japan had set the fed funds rate to 1%, which at the time was deemed exceedingly low compared with other countries, like the U.S. The global community still looked upon these rates with disbelief and growing annoyance at the small payoff in terms of real growth.
Japan was the first to have zero policy rates and the first to conduct “quantitative easing.” Albeit, Japan’s version of QE was on an altogether smaller scale than some of the Western central banks have, to date, managed since 2008. Now the country seems to point the way toward the next phase in the evolution of modern central banking: the open and unapologetic politicization of the central bank and the demotion of the head central banker to PR man.
Any pretence of the “independence” of central bankers has been unceremoniously dumped in Japan. Ministers take part in central bank meetings and give joint statements with central bank governors afterward. New Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made it very clear what he wants the central bank to do (print more money faster, devalue the yen, create inflation), and to that end, he is looking for a new central bank governor. Of course, only accredited “doves” need apply. A few days ago, Mr. Abe also spelled out what skill set he is really looking for: good marketing skills. Salesmanship:
The course of monetary policy is pretty much fixed. Now it is all about marketing.
In the meantime, the debasement of paper money continues.
Detlev Schlichter is a writer and Austrian School economist who has spent nearly twenty years working in international finance, including for Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, and Wester Asset Management.
His book Paper Money Collapse conclusively illustrates why paper money systems—those based on an elastic and constantly expanding supply of money as opposed to a system of commodity money of essentially fixed supply—are inherently unstable and why they must lead to economic disintegration.
Paper Money Collapse shows that the present crisis is the unavoidable result of elastic money; and that the continuous money production to stimulate the economy could lead to a complete collapse of the monetary system.
This post first reappeared at Laissez Faire Today