tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post3499203954106500106..comments2024-03-29T10:51:27.752+13:00Comments on Not PC: The problem is not dirty dairying; it's still dirty government Peter Cresswellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-54419873196333752672018-05-08T09:40:16.393+12:002018-05-08T09:40:16.393+12:00Thanks Peter. I still don't have a definite i...Thanks Peter. I still don't have a definite idea on how dirty dairying could be specifically addressed - taking into account both the non-point source nature, and the potential time lag between excessive nitrogen use and any negative effects. But your elaboration does give me an inkling, and a starting point for where a solution probably lies. Given the complexity of the issue, a lot of detailed work would be required to come up with something that works, and convince others who aren't predisposed to non-regulatory solutions.MarkThttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06199883270652041621noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-6114132998775601752018-05-07T22:41:52.808+12:002018-05-07T22:41:52.808+12:00Peters response here , is better than his original...Peters response here , is better than his original article... for me.<br />I think I get it... and pretty much agree with it all.. makes alot of sense to me.<br />I have a problem with the cost of taking cases to court , for ordinary people, ...but having small pollution tribunals nicely solves that issue.<br />roelofhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09477578372828055473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-84171906712054470422018-05-07T17:13:55.343+12:002018-05-07T17:13:55.343+12:00This comment has been removed by the author.roelofhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09477578372828055473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-4991306711436225122018-05-07T17:08:07.265+12:002018-05-07T17:08:07.265+12:00My own view is that both common law and regulatory...My own view is that both common law and regulatory oversight have their place.<br /><br />I am thankful that most markets that I trade have regulatory oversight.<br />( I would never have the resources to ever take a Broker or counterparty to a trade, thru a court process )<br />In its purest sense, a regulator keeps the playing field level, by making sure the players are playing BY THE RULES. The rules being, maybe, those things that are enshrined in property rights and tested and evolved thru common law, as well as laws enacted by Govt. ( which is another story )<br /><br />In rugby it is vastly more efficient to have a referee than to have individual players going thru some kind of adjudication process.<br /><br />The videos' example of the EPA shows how a regulatory body can evolve and mutate into some kind of egoic bureaucratic monster.<br /><br />Surely, there is a "sweet spot", where a regulator plays a vital role in helping to make sure property rights are respected, and is more efficient than having many individuals fighting things out in court ( which can be expensive )..??<br /><br />Peter, I'd be interested to hear your point of view on this video/story. <br />The old guy is straightforward, honest, and principled.<br />He had no satisfaction thru the "common law process".<br />https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11963237roelofhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09477578372828055473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-69537030900823205052018-05-07T16:39:26.093+12:002018-05-07T16:39:26.093+12:003. Setting up of land trusts, water trusts and con...3. Setting up of land trusts, water trusts and conservancies, which would have similar legal rights and standing in the water quality, and even greater common law interests in protecting waterways. They could sue, as above, but if properly backed by government (with the power to offer tax incentives for example for cleaner behaviour) they could also negotiate conservation easements with farmers. “"Conservation easements are essentially agreements which set out conservation obligations for a property that are then registered on the land title. As a result, landowners agree to be legally bound to these land use and conservation obligations, which can then be enforced against current and future landowners by the holder. For example, an easement might restrict the development of land, the cutting of trees, or require the maintenance of fences to keep livestock out of a stream".75 "Easements are like a bundle of rights... different types of property rights are transferred to the land trust… originally broad rights like right to develop or clear land... but easements are getting very sophisticated... including language limiting use of pesticides, types of farming etc.".76 Basically, the landowner gives up certain rights or agrees to certain practices in exchange for tax benefits.” http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/1000/10294253.pdf<br />4. And in the end, as one means of transition from the bullying of statute to something better, there is still a means by which the power of law can be used to encourage the growth of a market of tradeable rights — it could still allow a minister to look “active,” which all politicians like, but it would still require some humility from his regulators. Bruce Yandle explains: “But, we can get a force that deals with the non-point source pollution problem. We got it on the Tar River in North Carolina, where the EPA said “Look, the approach we are taking is not going to solve your problem. Eighty percent of the problem in this river and in this sound is from non-point sources, and we can’t solve it [with statute]. But if you don’t do it, we will lay some regulatory concrete on you like none you have ever seen.” And so those people formed a not-for-profit corporation, called the Tar-Pamlico River Basin Association. They defined property rights and they have markets and they have trading and they are relying on common law contracts. But there was a gun put to their heads!<br />“So maybe you can have a force that elicits a response. I’m not suggesting that we have arrived with<br />this. But it does show, in a way, how markets can emerge from under the regulatory concrete.”<br />[PS: Oops, I've written five points rather than four. But there you go.]Peter Cresswellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-47147222088600407642018-05-07T16:38:29.130+12:002018-05-07T16:38:29.130+12:00Interesting. But I'm not sure that it's su...Interesting. But I'm not sure that it's such a problem as you might think.<br /><br />David Parker is applying a top-down solution to (excuse me) a bottom-up problem — trying to force change on farmers to what he thinks farmers should be doing (growng apricots rather than cows) in the way of central planners everywhere. Because from the top down, when change needs to happen at the margins, effecting that change always look too difficult when you're looking at it from the top down.<br /><br />But it isn’t necessary, as a few of those older articles I link to point out. And more recently, Elizabeth Brubaker’s book ‘Greener Pastures’ focusses more directly on this problem, and discusses the common law solutions that can work, if given legal power by the removal of failing statute law.<br /><br />The aim, as always with common law, is to devolve legal power to those on the ground, to those with genuine interests in resolving the problem(s), rather than to those in the political firmament whose self-interests are radically different.<br /><br />Non-point sources needn’t be a problem if they're broken down, since essentially these are just point sources on a smaller scale, i.e., a scale too big for the central planners to contemplate solutions. But these are precisely the cases in which its most important to devolve legal power to those on the ground who have genuine interest in each and every point source — which is precisely what common law does. In this case, I’d suggest four things to get this going:<br /><br />1. Removal, as a matter of urgency, of any “right to pollute” granted by the RMA. This would give common law the power to breathe again.<br />2. Set up Small Pollution Tribunals along the lines of inexpensive Disputes Tribunals, to which anyone with legal standing has access to make a claim, all of these Tribunals held by precedent to the prior decisions of higher courts.<br />2. Recognise greater legal power in those with riparian rights, giving them standing to sue for pollution in these tribunals in either nuisance (which recognises that some pollution will always happen) or trespass (which is essentially zero tolerance to every molecule), such suits setting precedents allowing (for example) writs to be issued for other obvious situations out in the wild.<br />CONTINUED BELOW ...Peter Cresswellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-82512279010241217862018-05-07T14:28:26.979+12:002018-05-07T14:28:26.979+12:00"Under common law for example, those with rec..."Under common law for example, those with recreational or water rights along the Waikato or with rights to fish the lakes of Rotorua or the headwaters of the Tarawera River would have recourse against farmers or pulp and paper mills who polluted the fishery"<br /><br />In that example this principle works. You have a known point source for the pollution, and the effects of any pollution will be almost immediately obvious. But there are two difficulties when trying to apply it to the effects of dairying:<br /><br />1. The effects can be very long term. Excessive nitrogen for instance builds up in the soil profile and gradually extends deeper down over a long period. It could be say a century between the excessive nitrogen use commencing on a farm, and it reaching the groundwater to have a noticeable effects on drinking water quality downstream. By then the damage is done (or not) and it's too late.<br /><br />2. The downstream effects can rarely be attributed to a point source - every farm upstream could conceivably be contributing (and in Canterbury that's typically a lot of farms). Even when the effects do become known in the longer term, and can be attributed specifically to dairying, how do you hold anyone in particular to account when there's so many potential pollutters, particular when it relates to what was happening on the farm decades earlier? <br /><br />I suspect there may well be a free market/common law solution to this problem, but I don't know what it is. We'd be a lot more convincing if we were able to apply the general principle of what you're saying (which I support) to the specific problem of dairying - given that's the subject matter of this post.<br />MarkThttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06199883270652041621noreply@blogger.com