tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post1768889665024079903..comments2024-03-30T00:09:27.602+13:00Comments on Not PC: #CountdownToAnzacDay: So who pulled the trigger that started the war? [updated]Peter Cresswellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-87596002667044342342016-03-14T20:13:18.108+13:002016-03-14T20:13:18.108+13:00$$$ URGENT LOAN OFFER WITH LOW INTEREST RATE APPLY...$$$ URGENT LOAN OFFER WITH LOW INTEREST RATE APPLY NOW $$$<br />Do you need Loan to pay off your debt and start a new life? You have come to the right place were you can get FUNDED at a very low interest rate. Interested people/company should please contact us via email for more details. <br /><br />Full name:<br />Date of birth (yyyy-mm-dd):<br />Gender:<br />Marital status:<br />Amount Needed:<br />Duration:<br />Address:<br />City:<br />State/province:<br />Zip/postal code:<br />Country:<br />Phone number:<br />Monthly Income:<br />Occupation:<br /><br />E-mail: shadiraaliuloancompany1@gmail.comMohamed Alihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13110714870720006179noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-2981813634993177842015-04-26T16:01:35.277+12:002015-04-26T16:01:35.277+12:00Enjoying this series of yours. Has had me boning ...<br />Enjoying this series of yours. Has had me boning up. My thinking..<br /><br />Germany pulled the trigger and their leadership is 100% responsible. They crossed into Belgium. They had crossed into Luxembourg. They rejected & avoided talks. They stirred up Austro-Hungary on Serbia, knowingly provoking Russia. They wanted a bit of a war. As with all aggressors, they were opportunist, having a crack & seeing what they could get away with. They bet the farm they could pull it off on two fronts and put the Russians/Slavs in their place. They wanted to establish for themselves a status of world supremacy they felt entitled to. It was reckless opportunism, fortified by Prussian faith in 'blood & iron.'<br /><br />On Grey - he did not clearly signal British intentions to Germany. Whether that would have had an effect on Germany, at the crisis stage of July, is debatable. He would look better to history if he had been clear & clear early. But I don't think he actually knew what British intentions were anyway.<br /><br />His main failing was, I think, to have positioned Britain over the previous 10 years in the role of referee in Europe, rather than as player. These were perhaps his natural, gentlemanly instincts, 'nice guy' instincts. <br /><br />British thinking had moved away from that of Palmerston, who'd said in 1848: "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." A sound, simple outlook that had served Britain well for 60 years or so, and caused hostiles to pause.<br /><br />Grey did not see his role simply as protector of British interests; he got himself into the power balancing business, trying to balance the interests of everyone else. Had Britain remained a player, Germany might have thought longer & harder. But Britain had become referee. Referees are tolerated, but not feared. You work around them, get away with what you can.<br /><br />To make it more complex, or actually quite simple, Britain did not really have interests in Europe. Its interests were dotted across the seas. <br /><br />Britain was then forced to become a player, and when you get to Gallipoli the British interest was now to bring an end to the war asap, by some new initiative.<br /><br />The argument that it would've been best for Britain to have stayed out is really seductive. As one guy said, given the course of the next 60 years (Communism, Nazism, Holocaust, WW2, Eastern block, statism) could things have been any worse? But, hindsight is 202/20 so you need stand in the shoes of Britain at the time.<br /><br />A German dominated continent was a threat to British interests. The invasion of Belgium revealed a German regime prepared to do anything it takes to get their way. Certainly not one to be reasoned with. You'd have felt you're going to have to fight them someday, so it might as well be now alongside the French, while the French still had an army. I find such arguments regrettably persuasive.<br /><br />Look forward to what you have to say.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> <br /><br /><br /><br />Sam Phttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09035978404256500568noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-68458647625754442202015-04-23T14:57:18.413+12:002015-04-23T14:57:18.413+12:00" I'll look her up." I just did, and..." I'll look her up." I just did, and it's a *him.* But I couldn't fathom to what your reference might be? Something in 'Music Man'?Peter Cresswellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-73507173281528772872015-04-23T14:54:14.516+12:002015-04-23T14:54:14.516+12:00@c. papen: And I hadn't heard of Meredith Wils...@c. papen: And I hadn't heard of Meredith Wilson. I'll look her up. Thanks.<br /><br />Yes, Heinlein captures the spirit well in 'To Sail Beyond the Sunset,' although the cataclysm didn't affect the U.S. anything like it did Europe.<br /><br />That quality, once you understand it -- rational, benevolent, upward looking -- gives some context to (ironically) Sir Edward Grey's much-quoted comment as the July Crisis reached its denouement, that "the lamps are going out across Europe, and we may not see them lit again in our lifetime."<br /><br /> Zweig's autobiography is a fantastic if tragic account of the lamps going out, and what was lost with it.Peter Cresswellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-33974530943838095842015-04-23T14:44:52.824+12:002015-04-23T14:44:52.824+12:00Peter,
I appreciate the quote from Rand on the ant...Peter,<br />I appreciate the quote from Rand on the antebellum spirit of the times. I'd not heard of Zweig before, but Meredith Wilson, an American playwright, and Robert Heinlein the Scifi writer are both on record with much the same observation as Rand. That there was a quality to the prewar years that was hard to describe but that it was, among other things, benevolent and upward looking. c papenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06282668997314380216noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-69175921960831468912015-04-23T10:36:35.032+12:002015-04-23T10:36:35.032+12:00Further, you say: "As to Churchill. Well, the...Further, you say: <i>"As to Churchill. Well, the "agreements" with the French that were hammered out ... that you consider as "informal", were really not as "informal" as you think, and were hardly "secret."</i>" <br /><br />Well I don't' say "secret" since that sounds more conspiratorial than is justified. Things all round were more cockup that conspiracy.<br /><br />There were 'agreements' with the French both informal and formal, and both held close and made public. Some were known only to Grey (who failed to even tell his PM); some known only to cabinet -- almost none were known the public or the parliament, to whom for eight years Grey had said there were no agreements with any European power, none at all, that would encumber Britain in time of war. <br /><br />As Grey's own speech to the house proved, however, the naval agreement did so encumber them -- as did his call for Britain to "honour" the private agreements he had made and about which the parliament knew little or nothing.<br /><br />The naval agreement that Grey now insisted required British entry into war was part of informal naval discussions between France and Britain, to which both Churchill and Grey had agreed, in which France agreed to patrol the Mediterranean on behalf of Britain, in return for Britain being ready to defend the French coast for France. That Germany were ready to offer Britain a pledge it would not attack the French coast if Britain agreed to neutrality indicates that German at least realised the implications of the agreement. That Grey chose to tell the parliament about the agreement, but not the offer, indicates he realised them too -- and chose to use them. <br /><br />"<i>There are many causes to that catastrophe, and it may well be the in the final analysis the events of July 1914 are more effects than causes--certainly that is true for a great many of the failure you enumerate.</i>"<br /><br />Oh, indeed! As I say, " we can see *who*? Barely. ... The question remains *why* were all those important triggers pulled? That's what I hope to try in a subsequent post.<br /><br />"<i>The question before us ... is this: will Western man put this finally behind him and return to the great work of his civilisation?</i>"<br /><br />Couldn't agree more. But to return to the great work of our civilisation, we need to understand the forces that tear it down.<br /><br />To turn Hillary Clinton on her head (and there's a delightful image on which to close) at this point, even a hundred-and-one years later, it does matter.Peter Cresswellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-70079855257471635812015-04-23T10:35:16.616+12:002015-04-23T10:35:16.616+12:00Anonymous (any reason you can't put a name to ...Anonymous (any reason you can't put a name to your opinion?): <i>"...hard on Grey"</i>? I'm simply recounting the various triggers that were pulled. You want "hard on Grey," then (not to give too much away, but... ) wait until next week. Or read the 1908 view of the <i>Daily News</i> editor: "The inflexibility of his mind, unqualified by large knowledge. swift apprehension of events or urgent passion for humanity, constitutes a peril to the future... the slow movement of his mind and his unquestioning faith in the honesty of those on whom he has to rely render it easy for him to drift into courses which a mor imaginative sense and a swifter instinct would lead him to question and repudiate."<br /><br />He was a man who spent the longest time as Foreign Secretary, yet had had no languages, little imagination, minimal insight, and he never once left England. He was, said Lloyd George, "a pilot whose hand trembled in the palsy of apprehension,unable to grip the levers and manipulate them with a firm and clear purpose ... waiting for public opinion to decide his direction for him."<br /><br />And those were the opinions of people who *liked* him!<br /><br />Simple point, for right or wrong the primary argument for an alliance in terms of peace-making is that you form a combined public face to an enemy by which you intend to discourage their aggression. Grey turned this on its head, whispering to Russia and France that Britain would back them, while shouting publicly to Germany and AUstria-Hungary that Britain might not -- thereby removing any advantage of the informal Entente Britain had joined.<br /><br />Further, since in a formal alliance all parties guarantee to come to the aid of an ally should it be attacked, it's incumbent on any responsible party to counsel allies against inviting attack. Grey never once counselled Russia against its blank cheque to Serbia, or against its aggressive diplomacy against Austria-Hungary, or against its mobilisation - instead he went hand-wringing to German and Hapsburg ambassadors begging their own leaders to show restraint -- nor did he counsel France against giving Russia its own blank cheque. Instead, he argued it wasn't the role of someone who wasn't a formal ally.<br /><br />The result of Grey's two-faced obtuseness was that Britain and the Commonwealth enjoyed all the disadvantages of alliance, and not one of the advantages -- and European powers were left not knowing where Britain would fall when the knowing might, perhaps, have impeded their bellicosity.<br /><br /><i>"You imagine that he had more power and sway than he actually did."</i> Well, his counsel was certainly respected around Europe -- just see how quickly the Kaiser stopped the attack on the West at a mere hint from Grey about Britain staying neutral.<br /><br />And it's generally conceded that until Grey's speech atttached here that there was no majority in Britain or the parliament for going to war; after that speech (as Ramsay MacDonald conceded in his own) there was none for staying out. <br /><br />As far as his sway in cabinet, as PM Asquith himself conceded both to his diaries and his young mistress, of the cabinet only Churchill and Grey were wholeheartedly for going in. Asquith was a fence-sitter. For better or worse, by hook and by crook, it was Grey who swayed him, the cabinet and the parliament.<br /><br />Not bad for a bloke of inflexible mind and "characterised by no distinction of phrase or thought."Peter Cresswellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10699845031503699181noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-17224433171172647672015-04-23T08:48:04.203+12:002015-04-23T08:48:04.203+12:00According to the book "The Death of Money&quo...According to the book "The Death of Money" Europe has been at it for 1200 years so I suspect the likely answer to the question is not as easy as you make out to be. I was interested to read some years ago that Krupp had a patent on the fuses in the artillery shells everyone used and the British had to pay royalties to them at the end of the war based on casualty stats. Now that is a win win.<br /><br />3:16Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11906042.post-22403436677258656102015-04-22T23:23:20.505+12:002015-04-22T23:23:20.505+12:00You are a bit hard on Grey here. He tried mightil...You are a bit hard on Grey here. He tried mightily to avert this--he was the motive force behind attempts at diplomatic reconciliation to buy some time during that fateful July. The Austrians, with help from the French and that Germans, scotched that. Also the speech he gave was more an expression of the consensus of government at the time then a "personal trigger" and absolutely no one at the time was wondering what "his motives" were. You imagine that he had more power and sway than he actually did. As to Churchill. welll, the "agreements" with the French that were hammered out by people like Wilson, the that you consider as "informal", were really not as "informal" as you think, and where hardly "secret":witness The German governments constant bickering about them in the decade before the war. (And I would also remind you that the French were giving a great deal of aid to the Serbs prior to the war in the hopes of destabilizing Austria.)<br /><br />There are many causes to that catastrophe, and it may well be the in the final analysis the events of July 1914 are more effects than causes--certainly that is true for a great many of the failure you enumerate.<br /><br />The question before us, however, is this: will Western man put this finally behind him and return to the great work of his civilization? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com